ATLAS OF LANGUAGE

AT-134-036 · ATLAS 260

Mimesis

Creative imitation or representation of actions, voices, and worlds in art and narrative.

Part of the subject path Poetics, Narrative and Representation

Why is this entry in the Atlas?

A · Analytical concept R1 · Distinct contribution to understanding

Mimesis contributes a framework for examining how representation selects and shapes a world. Keeping its different theoretical traditions visible prevents imitation from being reduced to faithful copying alone.

Colours and admission grounds

The rectangular label identifies the entry function: F – linguistic figure or procedure; A – analytical concept; G – foundational concept; E – selected concrete case. The rounded badge indicates the admission ground: R1 – distinctive contribution; R2 – necessary foundation; R3 – justified illustrative case. This editorial rationale explains the current selection rather than claiming an undocumented original selection history.

Explanation

Mimesis is not merely mirror-like imitation but the formative presentation of actions, voices, experiences, or possible worlds. Representation selects, orders, and shapes; it can make reality recognisable while offering models for how that reality should be understood, felt, or judged. Different theories emphasise resemblance to a model, the creative production of an autonomous world, or the embodied social appropriation of patterns. The conceptual movement therefore asks what is represented, which medial procedures create presence, and how the difference between representation and represented object makes cognition, critique, participation, or deception possible in the first place.

Movement of thought

1. A possible object, action, or representational pattern is identified as the work's point of reference. 2. Selection, arrangement, voice, and medium show that imitation is always already formative. 3. The produced world is examined for the positions of perception and evaluation it makes available. 4. Distances and ruptures between representation and model reveal cognition, critique, or illusion. 5. Historical theoretical vocabularies clarify which sense of mimesis a particular argument invokes.

Scientific use case

Literary, theatre, media, and art studies, as well as anthropology, analyse mimesis as a relation among world, form, and action. They distinguish theoretical traditions and examine representational power, embodiment, and reception.

Example

An audio work does not reproduce an actual conversation verbatim. Through pauses, overlapping voices, and recurring sounds, however, it makes perceptible how memory both preserves and transforms a shared past.

Counterexample

External resemblance alone does not establish a significant mimetic relation when no formative act of representation or presentation is involved. Conversely, a non-naturalistic work is not therefore necessarily anti-mimetic.

Distinction

Distinguish mimesis from copying, imitation in the narrow behavioural sense, and representation as neutral substitution. It includes the productive shaping through which actions and worlds become sensuously or narratively present.

Effect on thought and perception

Mimesis makes the absent or possible present and invites provisional participation. Its vividness can nevertheless make selection and construction appear to be natural reality.

Resonance

A represented world answers the experienced world without coinciding with it. Within that difference, reality can return while also becoming otherwise.

Cite this entry

Reich, Michael (Hrsg./ed.): „Mimesis“. Atlas der Sprache, AT-134-036. ATLAS 260, data model 1.6.0. https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-134-036

https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-134-036

The address remains stable; editorial content may evolve. Editorial reading state: 2026-10-15. Include your access date for precise references.

Historical background

Bullinger describes the representation or imitation of another person’s sayings and, in some cases, movements or thoughts. He also notices the reuse of a word characteristic of another speaker. This is narrower than a general theory of art as representation, and the Atlas should identify which history its profile intends to trace. The rhetorical witness makes the represented voice central: an utterance can be recognised as someone else’s manner even when it is spoken or written by a new agent. That recognition does not guarantee faithful reproduction. Selection, exaggeration and recontextualisation can alter the represented person’s position. The nineteenth-century account consequently offers a bridge to questions of voice and attribution without establishing a continuous genealogy from every ancient philosophical use to every modern one.

Peacham’s 1593 entry adds voice, pronunciation and gesture to the imitation of another’s words. His pairing of visual and auditory representation makes the embodied performance particularly clear. At the same time, his warning about flattering entertainers caricaturing others shows that recognisability is not a guarantee of fairness or fidelity. This rhetorical branch must remain distinct from a complete history of mimesis in aesthetics.

How conceptual history changes the analysis

Imitation is shaping; recognisable proximity proves neither completeness nor fairness.