Explanation
Probability orders possibilities according to how expectable an event or how plausible a proposition is under specified conditions. In mathematics it can be calculated as a value within a defined model; in everyday and rhetorical use it often denotes a graded judgement supported by experience, endoxa, or indications. These levels must not be allowed to merge unnoticed. A precise number appears objective but depends on model, data, reference class, and assumptions. A plausible narrative can be persuasive without becoming statistically probable. Probability does not turn uncertainty into certainty; it makes alternatives comparable and supports reasoned decisions under risk. Its movement proceeds from several possible courses through explicit or implicit weights to a provisional expectation that remains revisable in light of new evidence.
Movement of thought
1. Several possible events or explanations are initially open, and none can yet be treated as certain. 2. Data, experience, models, indications, or shared assumptions provide reasons for assigning different weights to the possibilities. 3. A quantitative probability or qualitative ordering of plausibility emerges and supports expectation, argument, and decision. 4. A counter-test examines reference class, evidence base, and alternatives and separates probability from possibility, certainty, and mere credibility. 5. New evidence changes the weights; expectation returns as revisable orientation while preserving the possibilities not selected.
Scientific use case
Statistics, philosophy of science, argumentation, and risk research analyse models, base rates, Bayesian updating, and linguistic probability markers. Experiments test how numerical and verbal scales are understood.
Example
A forecast gives a 70 per cent probability of rain for the region. This means neither that rain will fall for 70 per cent of the day nor that it is certain at one location.
Counterexample
An event is logically possible, but there are neither frequency data nor a model nor grounded indications of its expectedness. Possibility alone supplies no particular probability.
Distinction
Distinguish it from possibility, plausibility, credibility, evidence, certainty, frequency, risk, doxa, endoxa, and induction; explicitly mark mathematical, epistemic, and rhetorical uses.
Effect on thought and perception
Probability judgements enable action without certainty and make uncertainty comparable; poor reference classes, spurious precision, or rhetorical plausibility can systematically distort decisions.
Resonance
Between possibility and actuality lies a field of weighted paths; every new indication shifts its lines without fully determining the future.
Etymology
Technical core term; individual etymological review pending
Provenance
Unresolved relation network → second core-concept review → Metzler/HWRh cross-check → ATLAS 239
Cite this entry
Reich, Michael (Hrsg./ed.): „Probability“. Atlas der Sprache, AT-CORE-239-068. ATLAS 260, data model 1.6.0. https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-CORE-239-068The address remains stable; editorial content may evolve. Editorial reading state: 2026-10-15. Include your access date for precise references.
Historical background
Locke’s chapter on probability begins from a practical limit: people must judge and act where demonstration is unavailable. He contrasts seeing a necessary connection for oneself with accepting a proposition on testimony. Even a mathematical statement can therefore be held on different grounds by different people, depending on whether they understand its proof or trust a reporter. His account asks readers to consider experience, the competence and integrity of witnesses, consistency and contrary testimony. Probability here is primarily an epistemic problem of warranted assent; the passage is not an axiomatic account of numerical probabilities. For the Atlas, the historical contribution is the separation of confidence from the grounds that justify it. A persuasive report may deserve examination without becoming certain, and the balance of reasons can alter the degree of assent. Locke’s illustrative narratives are arguments within the text, not independently verified historical events. The term’s earlier lexical history and the development of mathematical probability require additional sources beyond this chapter.
How conceptual history changes the analysis
Separate degree of conviction from its grounds: direct examination, quality of testimony and counterevidence.
References for the historical section
- John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (first published with the date 1690), Books III–IV; Gutenberg transcription identified as based on the second edition · IV.xv.1–6; distinction between demonstration, testimony and degrees of assent
Selected original-English passages read; not collated against first-edition page images. Modern profile labels are explicitly distinguished from the terminology used by Locke. His account of ideas is a historical philosophical position, not a verified contemporary model of language or cognition.