ATLAS OF LANGUAGE

AT-HAR6-0001 · ATLAS 260

Accismus

Feigned refusal of something actually desired.

Part of the subject path Rhetoric and Style

Why is this entry in the Atlas?

F · Figure / procedure R1 · Distinct contribution to understanding

Accismus identifies performed refusal of something desired, making the divergence between displayed stance and underlying preference central. A genuine refusal must not be redescribed as feigned without evidence of an opposing desire.

Colours and admission grounds

The rectangular label identifies the entry function: F – linguistic figure or procedure; A – analytical concept; G – foundational concept; E – selected concrete case. The rounded badge indicates the admission ground: R1 – distinctive contribution; R2 – necessary foundation; R3 – justified illustrative case. This editorial rationale explains the current selection rather than claiming an undocumented original selection history.

Explanation

Accismus is feigned refusal of, or indifference to, something actually desired. It separates desire from expressed stance: an offer is apparently rejected so that modesty, dignity, social independence, or higher value may be displayed. The figure works only when concealed interest is at least inferable to participants; otherwise the refusal may be genuine. Accismus can be playful politeness, but it can also obscure negotiation and consent. Analysis compares utterance, observable interest, situational norms, and later conduct while avoiding unsupported claims about an inner wish.

Movement of thought

1. The explicit refusal or indifference is first recorded literally and without imputing a hidden motive. 2. Contextual evidence of actual interest is gathered from conduct, prior history, and subsequent response. 3. Social norms explain why immediate acceptance might appear greedy, dependent, immodest, or risky. 4. Offer, renewed invitation, and eventual acceptance reveal how both sides coordinate performed reluctance. 5. Genuine refusal remains a counter-hypothesis until contrary evidence makes feigned desire plausible.

Scientific use case

Pragmatics, politeness research, negotiation analysis, literary studies, and cross-cultural research examine accismus through indirect preference display and sequential confirmation. Methodologically, desire must be inferred from evidence rather than cultural stereotype.

Example

Offered a ceremonial lecture, an honoured researcher says, “Surely there are people more qualified than I,” although she has prepared notes and gladly accepts after the expected second invitation.

Counterexample

Polite hesitation, ambivalence, or sincere refusal is not automatically accismus. Actual desire must be supported by context or later conduct rather than merely attributed by an observer.

Distinction

Distinguish accismus from irony, litotes, modesty topoi, genuine refusal, and indecision. Accismus requires performed distance from a real desire; modesty alone need not conceal an opposite intention to act.

Effect on thought and perception

Accismus can make acceptance socially acceptable, protect status, and invite affirmation. It can also obscure responsibility or pressure another person to repeat and intensify an offer.

Resonance

The spoken no carries a quiet movement towards yes. Resonance arises when another person recognises that hidden direction and answers it with a renewed offer.

Cite this entry

Reich, Michael (Hrsg./ed.): „Accismus“. Atlas der Sprache, AT-HAR6-0001. ATLAS 260, data model 1.6.0. https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-HAR6-0001

https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-HAR6-0001

The address remains stable; editorial content may evolve. Editorial reading state: 2026-10-15. Include your access date for precise references.

Historical background

Silva Rhetoricae defines accismus as feigning rejection of something earnestly desired and points to Bullinger, p.962. That cross-reference has now been inspected directly in the scan. Bullinger treats apparent refusal and explicitly excludes a genuine refusal later reversed through a change of mind. His theological example, however, concerns refusal of another person’s request; it does not automatically establish the refusing person’s own desire for the thing rejected. The narrower Atlas definition is consequently supported by the modern reference entry, while Bullinger supplies a broader historical neighbouring use. The proposed history keeps these scopes apart and does not adopt his offered derivation. Neither an English first occurrence nor a German borrowing history is claimed.

How conceptual history changes the analysis

Distinguish feigned refusal from genuine rejection and a later change of mind. In the original example “No, I could not possibly accept the award”, the utterance alone is insufficient. Evidence that the speaker wants the award but stages its rejection supports accismus. Without that evidence, interpreting every refusal as concealed desire becomes unwarranted mind-reading.