Explanation
An icon refers to its object through perceived resemblance or structural correspondence. It may be a picture, but also a diagram, an imitation of sound, or a spatial arrangement whose relations resemble those of the represented domain. Iconicity is not simple copying: the features counted as similar depend on selection, convention, medium, and an observer’s knowledge. A transit map does not resemble its network photographically, yet preserves selected topological relations. The icon therefore leads beyond recognition to the question of which structure is transferred, which is omitted, and which is made salient by the representation itself.
Movement of thought
1. A perceptible sign and a possible object first appear as separate entities. 2. Observers detect a resemblance or relational correspondence between them. 3. Selected features of the sign are read as a model of properties of the object. 4. A counter-test examines the differences, conventions, and omissions that limit the resemblance. 5. The sign returns as a designed perspective that does not copy its object but displays it structurally.
Scientific use case
Semiotic and diagrammatic research can specify which features correspond between representation and object. Experiments can test whether different iconic models facilitate inference or generate systematic misconceptions.
Example
A transit map shortens distances and straightens lines while preserving connections. This structural likeness enables navigation although the diagram scarcely resembles the visible city.
Counterexample
A red traffic light means stop primarily through a learned rule and is therefore chiefly symbolic. Smoke refers causally to fire and functions in that respect as an index, not an icon.
Distinction
Distinguish icon from index, symbol, mere picture, and iconicity in general. An index rests on an actual connection and a symbol chiefly on convention; an icon may be imagistic, diagrammatic, or metaphorical.
Effect on thought and perception
Icons make relations perceptible, support transfer and inference, yet selectively direct attention towards particular similarities.
Resonance
One form answers another; a field of resemblance opens between sign and object in which structures echo across different materials.
Cite this entry
Reich, Michael (Hrsg./ed.): „Icon“. Atlas der Sprache, AT-103-021. ATLAS 260, data model 1.6.0. https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-103-021The address remains stable; editorial content may evolve. Editorial reading state: 2026-10-15. Include your access date for precise references.
Historical background
Peirce’s account of the icon is not confined to pictures that look like visible objects. In the 1896 discussion, an icon presents characters that can be contemplated without by itself identifying one particular existent object. A predicate can therefore involve an iconic presentation of a possible character. Around 1903, the discussion of mixed signs makes the point more concrete: a photograph can incorporate an image while its connection with what produced it contributes an indexical function. These are not two competing guesses about which single box every photograph must occupy. They distinguish aspects of its operation. For the Atlas, the historical gain is to separate resemblance or structural presentation from evidence that this particular object exists here. An image can be highly convincing without establishing that connection. The passages document stages in Peirce’s semiotic use of the English word icon, not its older religious or lexical origin. Later classification changes and the application to particular media must be traced separately rather than freezing these excerpts into an exhaustive taxonomy.
How conceptual history changes the analysis
Resemblance makes a character conceivable without establishing a particular existent.
References for the historical section
- Charles S. Peirce, primary passages identified by work/date and Collected Papers paragraph or manuscript number; online compilation by Joseph Ransdell, The Role of Icons in Predication (2005) · CP 3.433–435, The Regenerated Logic (1896); CP 4.447, Logical Tracts, No. 2 (c. 1903)
Named primary excerpts read in the online compilation, not collated against original manuscripts. CP numbers are paragraphs, not pages; approximate dates remain approximate. The compilation is not proof of first coinage. Changes across Peirce’s classifications must not be flattened into a single immutable system.